Showing posts with label crash. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crash. Show all posts

Saturday, June 15, 2024

The Waymo Utility Pole Crash

Waymo vs. utility pole smackdown: the utility pole won. No apparent extenuating circumstances.
Nobody was injured; the vehicle was empty. The pole suffered a minor dent but is still in service.

This video has an interview with the passenger who was waiting for pickup in Phoenix: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAZP-RNSr0s Waymo did not provide a comment for the story.


Now the Waymo utility pole safety recall report is out (https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2024/RCLRPT-24E049-1733.PDF). Interesting that the vehicle was executing a pullover maneuver at the time it hit the pole. From a validation point of view I'll bet it could go down the center of the alleyway just fine in normal driving, but what bit them was the combination of pulling to the side of the road and a pole happening to be in what the vehicle thought was a safe pullover area due to the map.

Still not addressed is how utility poles being assigned a "low damage score" could have made it all the way through peer reviews, simulation, and road testing -- and needed to be found in a crash which might been worse in other circumstances.

This serves as a stark reminder that these vehicles lack common sense, in this case "thinking" that running smack into a utility pole was no big deal. They are subject to software defects as are all computer-based systems. We still don't know if/when they will be better than human drivers at reducing fatalities. But we know for sure they will make unforced errors in driving, hype notwithstanding.
This is also a good reminder that safety validation needs to consider all operational modes, and it is common for the problems to crop up in unusual or failure recovery modes. While there is no indication of an equipment malfunction in this particular case, safety in abnormal mission termination modes is notoriously difficult because there might also be malfunctioning equipment that triggered the system mode change.

Description of defect: "Prior to the Waymo ADS receiving the remedy described in this report, a collision could occur if the Waymo ADS encountered a pole or pole-like permanent object and all of the following were true: 1) the object was within the the boundaries of the road and the map did not include a hard road edge between the object and the driveable surface; 2) the Waymo ADS’s perception system assigned a low damage score to the object; 3) the object was located within the Waymo ADS’s intended path (e.g. when executing a pullover near the object); and 4) there were no other objects near the pole that the ADS would react to and avoid. "

Since I've had a number of questions here is my best shot at clarifying the collision mechanism:
  • The alleyway is marked as drivable, because the entire alley road surface is in fact all drivable (no curb; mostly garage entranceways) -- except for utility poles once in a while 
  • The robotaxi's computer driver saw the utility pole in question, and correctly classified it as "utility pole".
  • A human drive would know "hitting utility pole == bad". However, some data structure somewhere in the computer driver was set that "hitting utility pole == OK". This applies to ALL utility poles EVERYWHERE, not just this particular utility pole.
  • So the computer driver drove smack into the utility pole thinking it was OK, when if fact it was not.

There was no mapping error involved in the collision. Changing the map is a workaround only.

I can speculate that somewhere there is an object classification system, and somehow (probably manually or semi-manually) each object type has an attribute of "OK to hit?" The global utility pole one was set incorrectly. There are other possibilities, but this is the simplest one.

What is shocking is that such a mistake could make it through quality, safety validation, and testing processes.


Monday, June 3, 2024

Five views into the Cruise Robotaxi Pedestrian Dragging Mishap

 On October 2, 2023, a Cruise robotaxi dragged a woman 20 feet underneath the vehicle in San Francisco. The circumstances of the mishap and everything else are complex. But the robotaxi industry was profoundly shaken.


Here are four descriptions of the events and what might be learned from those events. Each is in a different style, intended for a different audience.

Additional content:
  • A video podcast where I walk through the mishap events with Junko Yoshida & Bolaji Ojo: https://youtu.be/OaF6IbYoVHQ
  • Cruise also maintains a safety page. A the time of this writing the big fonts are used to say "transparent about safety" and "continuous improvement". So far not a lot of detail about what has changed and what transparency will mean as they get back on the road.


Saturday, October 28, 2023

A Snapshot of Cruise Crash Reporting Transparency: July & August 2023

A comparison of California Cruise robotaxi crash reports between the California DMV database and the NHTSA SGO database reveals significant discrepancies in reporting. 31 crashes reported to NHTSA do not appear in the California DMV database. This includes seven unreported injury crashes. Of special note is the Cruise crash with a fire truck that caused serious injury to an occupant of the Cruise robotaxi does not appear as a California DMV crash report. To be sure, Cruise might not be legally required to file these reports, but the situation reveals an apparent lack of transparency.

Comparison Results:

39 crashes were identified across both databases for the date-of-crash months of July 2023 through August 2023. The comparison was performed on October 28, 2023, so there was adequate time for all such crashes to have been reported.

Each database was missing one or more crashes found in the other database:

  • 39 crashes in the NHTSA base, including 8 also found in the CA DMV database.
  • 31 crashes reported to NHTSA were not in the California DMV database
  • The California DMV database was in particular missing SEVEN (7) crash reports which indicated an injury had occurred or might have occurred.
  1. NHTSA 30412-5968: Other car ran a red light striking Cruise; passenger of other vehicle treated on scene for minor injury.
  2. NHTSA 30412-5982: Other car ran into Cruise; passenger of other vehicle transported by EMS for further evaluation. Possible injury ("unknown" injury status).
  3. NHTSA 30412-6144: Cruise crash with fire truck; serious injury reported to passenger
  4. NHTSA 30412-6145: Cruise reversing contacted cyclist; minor injury reported to cyclist
  5. NHTSA 30412-6167: Cruise rear-ended after braking; minor injury reported to other vehicle driver
  6. NHTSA 30412-6175: Cruise hit pedestrian crossing in front of it (said to be crossing against light); moderate injury to pedestrian
  7. NHTSA 30412-6270: Cruise hit from behind after stopping to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk; minor injury to passengers inside AV
Two crashes involved non-motorists:
  • 30412-6145 with a cyclist
  • 30412-6175 with a pedestrian

        Why the Disparity?

        The thing that makes this complicated is that CA DMV does not require reporting crashes for "deployment" operation -- just for "testing" operation. Apparently when the regulations were written they did not anticipate that companies would "deploy" immature technology, but that is exactly what has happened.

        It is difficult from available information to check how Cruise is determining which crashes must be reported to California DMV (testing) and which do not have to be reported (deployment). In practice it might boil down to a management decision which ones they want to report, although there might be some less arbitrary internal decision criterion in use.

        CA DMV should require all companies to provide them with unredacted copies of all NHTSA SGO reports to provide improved transparency. For the foreseeable future, making a distinction between "testing" and "deployment" with no driver in the vehicle serves no useful purpose, and impairs transparency. If there is no driver it is a deployment, and should be held to the standards of a production vehicle, including reporting both crashes and driving behavior that puts other road users at undue risk. This is true for all companies, not just Cruise.

        Other notes:

        • CA DMV reports have the street names, yet Cruise redacts this same information from reports filed with NHTSA claiming it is "confidential business information." It is difficult to understand how information publicly reported by California can be classified as "confidential."
        • The NHTSA database does not have the date of the crash, although the California database has that information.
        • Crashes considered were for reported incident dates of July & August 2023, considering only uncrewed (no safety driver) operation.
        • It is our understanding that Cruise is not required to report all crashes that occur during deployment to California DMV. So it is possible that these reporting inconsistencies are still in accordance with applicable regulations.
        • All crashes on this spreadsheet in the NHTSA database list the "driver/operator type" as "Remote (Commercial / Test)" so it is not possible to distinguish whether the vehicle was considered in commercial service at the time of the crash. 
        • At the time of this posting the tragic Oct. 2nd severe injury crash that involved a Cruise robotaxi dragging a pedestrian who had been trapped under the vehicle has also not been reported, while another crash on Oct 6th has. There is nothing on the Oct 6th CA DMV form to indicate that the reported crash was specific to a testing permit vs. deployment permit.

        Review status: 

        This data has not been peer reviewed. Corrections/additions/clarifications are welcome to improve accuracy. The data analysis results are included below.

        Google Spreadsheet link:  https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1o9WWzMpiuum-QHZk9goY68gnBZuRC1InxUSMa7-h4DU/edit?usp=sharing

        Data sources: 






        Updated 10/30/2023 to incorporate three more crash reports found in a wider search of the SGO database. All CA DMV crash reports have now been identified in the SGO database.






        Saturday, October 21, 2023

        Safety Analysis of Two Cruise Robotaxi Pedestrian Injuries

        Cruise has now had two pedestrian injuries in San Francisco, with the more severe one being complicated because it involved a pedestrian first hit by another vehicle.  NHTSA has launched an investigation based on those injuries and at least two other public video reports of close encounters. This makes available the relevant crash reports, so we have more direct information about what happened. The question asked in this piece is what can be done to avoid similar crashes in the future.


        On a numbers basis, two pedestrian injuries in a span of fewer than six weeks for a fleet of a couple hundred vehicles in San Francisco is a concern, so this is worth some analysis based on available information.

        • First injury: Aug. 26, 2023.  A pedestrian stepped off the curb into a crosswalk right in front of a Cruise vehicle at the change of a traffic light. The Cruise swerved, then braked. Impact at 1.4 mph. Pedestrian transported by EMS.
        • Second injury: Oct 2, 2023. A pedestrian crosses on the opposite side of a cross-street in front of the Cruise vehicle and another vehicle next to it. Both vehicles proceeded through the intersection as a pedestrian was in a crosswalk across their paths. The other vehicle struck the pedestrian at an undisclosed speed, who was then run over by the Cruise vehicle and trapped under it with severe injuries.
        In both cases the injuries were severe enough to require transport. For the second crash the pedestrian was almost completely underneath the rear of the vehicle.  (It is worth noting these descriptions are written 100% by Cruise. The reader should assume the most favorable-to-Cruise possible interpretation of events has been presented. If something obviously relevant is omitted, such as the impact speed for the second injury, one is justified in assuming it would be unfavorable to Cruise if disclosed.)

        Cruise, predictably, blames others for both crashes, although in both cases without review of the video it is difficult to be sure that is really true. However, we set blame aside and instead ask the question: what can be done to avoid the next pedestrian injury in similar circumstances.

        First Pedestrian Crash


        For the first crash, the question is whether a reasonable human driver would have had contextual clues that this pedestrian was about to enter the crosswalk even though the light had changed. For example, were they running to catch a bus pulling up to a stop across the street?  Were they "distracted walking?" Or were they at a complete stop on the curb and literally jumped out into the street? Opportunities for improvement include asking these questions:
        • Were there obvious contextual clues that the pedestrian would attempt a last second crossing? What are common cases, and are they covered by the Cruise AV design?
        • Why did the vehicle swerve before stopping instead of doing both at once?
        • Could/should the Cruise vehicle have followed a less aggressive acceleration profile given the likely risk of a pedestrian entry into the crosswalk in that type of circumstance?

        Second Pedestrian Crash


        For the second crash, things are more complicated. Let's break down the sequence, taking into account the initial setup sketched below (note that both vehicles are in the middle of an intersection, but the sketch tool I used did not make this easy to represent):

        1. There are two vehicles starting through an intersection, side by side, with two lanes in that direction of travel. From a top view the other, human driven, dark-colored vehicle is on the left (faster lane) and the lighter-colored Cruise is on the right (curb lane).
        2. A pedestrian is walking across the far side of the intersection in the crosswalk. At the same time, both vehicles accelerate into the intersection. The most likely situation is the Cruise vehicle was a bit behind the other vehicle (although this is an educated guess based on the description of the events).
        3. Cruise says the pedestrian entered the crosswalk after the light changed, crossed in front of the Cruise vehicle, then stopped in the other vehicle's lane. The other driver presumably thought the pedestrian would clear the travel lane in time, and did not slow down.
        4. The other vehicle hit the pedestrian. Cruise says the pedestrian was deflected back into the Cruise vehicle's lane.
        5. The Cruise vehicle "braked aggressively" in response to a surprise pedestrian appearing in its lane, but hit the pedestrian shortly after.
        6. The Cruise vehicle had sufficient forward speed that it ran over the pedestrian and came to a stop with the pedestrian trapped under the rear axle. Both of the pedestrian's feet protruded from under the vehicle by the left rear tire, with that tire on top of one leg. (Photo link below.)
        7. The pedestrian was severely injured by a combination of the two vehicle strikes. Information about the ultimate outcome for that pedestrian is not currently available, although we hope that a recover is quick and as complete as possible.

        California Rules of the Road have an interesting requirement for crosswalks:

        "(c) The driver of a vehicle approaching a pedestrian within any marked or unmarked crosswalk shall exercise all due care and shall reduce the speed of the vehicle or take any other action relating to the operation of the vehicle as necessary to safeguard the safety of the pedestrian."  (emphasis added)

        It is interesting to ask if the Cruise vehicle actually exhibited "all due care."  It likely did not reduce speed from its normal green light acceleration, or Cruise would have taken credit for having done so.  (If they want to provide more details I will gladly update this statement.)

        Of note is the Cruise position that their vehicle stopped as quickly as possible once the pedestrian was in their lane, in effect claiming the collision was unavoidable. But that position is not necessarily true in the larger context, especially if one learns from this crash for the next potential pedestrian crosswalk collision. The question is when the Cruise AV could have stopped. There are at least three possible decision points for stopping to avoid this collision with the pedestrian, and the Cruise vehicle appears not to have exercised the first two:

        • The light changes green, but there is a pedestrian still in the crosswalk in the Cruise vehicle's direction of travel in front of the Cruise vehicle. Did it slow down?  Or execute a normal acceleration because it predicted the pedestrian would be clear by the time it got there?   A prudent human driver would have waited, or more likely crept forward while waiting to signal cars behind it not to honk for failing to recognize a green light.
        • The pedestrian clears the Cruise lane, but the Cruise vehicle clearly sees the pedestrian about to be hit by the adjacent vehicle. The Cruise vehicle could have (I would argue should have) stopped to avoid being close to an injury event. Expecting it to predict a pedestrian collision trajectory is asking a lot -- but it should have stopped precisely because it cannot predict what will happen after such a collision. Safety demands not going fast past a pedestrian who is about to be hit by another vehicle in an adjacent lane. But this is precisely what the Cruise vehicle did.
        • The pedestrian lands in the Cruise lane and the Cruise vehicle has not slowed down yet. By then it is too late, and it runs over the pedestrian.  This could likely have been avoided by a prudent driving strategy that addresses the previous two decision points.

        The Redacted Confidential Business Information

        (This section added October 25, 2023 based on new information.)

        California DMV issued an order suspending the driverless operating permits for Cruise robotaxis on October 24, 2023 as a response to the circumstances of this second crash.  Link to order here.

        This order brought to light that after the vehicle had stopped post-crash, it started movement again with the pedestrian still under the vehicle, dragging that victim about 20 feet at a speed up to 7 mph, which was said to contribute to severe injuries. This strongly suggests the vehicle did not account for a pedestrian being trapped underneath it when deciding to move. (It is possible a remote operator was unaware of the trapped pedestrian and remotely commanded a pull-to-side maneuver. We'll have to see what is revealed during any investigation.)

        Cruise also published a blog post with additional information that day. A straightforward update to the crash report is to add at the end as at least part of the "redacted confidential business information" the following (quoted from the Cruise blog post): 
        "The AV detected a collision, bringing the vehicle to a stop; then attempted to pull over to avoid causing further road safety issues, pulling the individual forward approximately 20 feet."

        This certainly makes Cruise look bad, but that is not an acceptable reason for a redcation. It is difficult to understand how this can reasonably be characterized as "confidential business information" in a mandatory crash report.

        Calling Emergency Services

        Also crucial for practical safety, but barely talked about, is notification of emergency services ("call 911"). News reports indicate that a passer-by called 911, not Cruise. In fact, in neither collision report do they take credit for notifying emergency services. This is a glaring omission that needs to be addressed.

        Consider: they had a vehicle tire on top of a pedestrian's leg and did not call 911. (Again, if this is incorrect I will update this statement when I get that information.) That's a HUGE problem nobody is talking about. A human driver would have realized they just ran someone over and either called 911 or asked someone to do so. If there had been no passer-by, how many minutes would that pedestrian have been trapped under the car before help was summoned?

        The Cruise AV and its support team need to realize an injury has happened and take immediate action. It would be no surprise if the remote operators had no idea what the vehicle had run over. By the time they download and review video logs (or whatever) that pedestrian has been trapped under the vehicle for a while. That's not acceptable. They need to be able to do better.

        Cruise Safety Record

        The first pedestrian injury happened just over two weeks after the August 10th California PUC meeting that granted operating permits to Cruise. That report was overshadowed by the crash apparently due to failure to yield to a fire truck on August 17th. That night also saw another injury involving a collision to a different vehicle driver.  So we are seeing a steady stream of injuries.

        Cruise blames crashes on other parties to the maximum degree possible, and ignores injuries where it is less than 50% at fault (there have been others; notably a very ill-advised left turn maneuver by a Cruise robotaxi that resulted in multiple injuries).  Safety is not achieved by blaming others. If Cruise vehicles are crashing and injuring people more often than other vehicles, then that is an increased rate of injury regardless of blame.

        A company with a responsible safety culture would be asking what they can do to reduce the risk of future injuries -- regardless of blame. We will have to wait to see the outcome of this NHTSA investigation, and whether Cruise proactively improves safety or waits for NHTSA to force the issue.

        As a note to likely responses to this analysis: comparisons to human driver errors are not productive. Indeed, another driver hit the pedestrian first in the second crash. But another driver being negligent does not forgive imprudent driving behavior from a robotaxi that is being relentlessly touted as safer than human drivers. They should be continuously improving, and our hope is that this analysis highlights areas that they and other robotaxi companies need to improve.

        Supporting Information


        Saturday, September 30, 2023

        Cruise publishes a baseline for their safety analysis

        Summary: a Cruise study suggests they are better than a young male ride hail driver in a leased vehicle. However, this result is an estimate, because there is not yet enough data to have a firm conclusion.


        I am glad to see Cruise release a paper describing the methodology for computing the human driver  baseline, which they had not previously done. Same too for their "meaningful risk of injury" estimation method. And it is good to see a benchmark that is specific to a deployment rather than a US average.

        Cruise has published a baseline study for their safety analysis here:
         blog post:  https://getcruise.com/news/blog/2023/human-ridehail-crash-rate-benchmark/
         baseline study: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/178179
        (note that the baseline study is a white paper and not a peer reviewed publication)

        The important take-aways from this in terms of their robotaxi safety analysis are:
        • The baseline is leased ride hail vehicles, not ordinary privately owned vehicles
        • The drivers of the baseline are young males (almost a third are below 30 years old)
        • A "meaningful risk of injury" threshold is defined, but somewhat arbitrary. They apparently do not have enough data to measure actual injury rates with statistical confidence. Given that we have seen two injuries to Cruise passengers so far (and at least one other injury crash), this is not a hypothetical concern.
        It should be no surprise if young males driving leased vehicles as Uber/Lyft drivers have a higher crash rate than other vehicles. That is their baseline comparison. In fairness, if their business model is to put all the Uber and Lyft drivers out of work, perhaps that is a useful baseline. But it does not scale to the general driving population.

        A conclusion that a Cruise robotaxi is safer (fewer injuries/fatalities) than an ordinary human driver is not quite supported by this study.
        • It is not an "average" human driver unless you only care about Uber/Lyft. If that is the concern, then OK, yes, that is a reasonable comparison baseline.
        • I did not see control for weather, time of day, congestion, and other conditions in the baseline. Road type and geo-fence were the aspects of ODD being used.
        • There is insufficient data to have a conclusion about injury rates, although that will come somewhat soon
        • We are a long way away from insight into how fatality rates will turn out, since the study and Cruise have about 5 million miles and San Francisco fatality rate is more like one per 100 million miles
        • The Cruise emphasis on "at fault" crashes is a distraction from crash outcomes that must necessarily include the contribution of defensive driving behavior (avoiding not-at-fault crashes)
        This study could support a Cruise statement that they are on track to being safe according to their selected criteria. But we still don't know how that will turn out. This is not the same as a claim of proven safety in terms of harm reduction.

        A different report does not build a model and estimate, but rather compares actual crash reports for robotaxis with crash reports for ride hail cars and comes to the conclusion that Cruise and Waymo operated at 4 to 8 times as many crashes as average US drivers, but that their crash rate is comparable to ride hail vehicles in California.

        https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373698259_Assessing_Readiness_of_Self-Driving_Vehicles

        Sunday, January 8, 2023

        The Tesla Autopilot Crashes Just Keep Coming

        Picture from a Tesla AP-related crash just before impact into a disabled vehicle:


        (Video here on twitter) Tesla autopilot crashes are still happening when drivers (apparently) succumb to automation complacency. It seems they've just stopped being news.

        The above picture is from a Tesla camera a fraction of a second before impact. (Somehow it seems there was no injury.) The Tesla was said to have initiated AEB (and disabled AP) about two seconds before impact. The video shows clear sightline to the disabled vehicle for at least 5 seconds, but the driver apparently did not react.

        Tesla fans can blame the driver all they want -- but that won't stop the next similar crash from happening. Pontificating about personal responsibility and that the driver should have known better won't change things either. And we're far, far past the point where "education" is going to move the needle on this issue.

        It's time to get serious about:
        - Requiring effective driver monitoring
        - Addressing the very real #autonowashing problem that has so many users of these features thinking their cars really drive themselves.
        - Requiring vehicle automation features to account for reasonably foreseeable misuse (you might fix the vehicle, or you might fix the driver, or more likely fix both, but casting blame accomplishes nothing)

        The deeper issue here is pretending that autopilot-type systems involve humans who think they are driving. The car is driving and the humans are along for the ride, no matter what disclaimers are in the driver manual and/or warnings -- unless the vehicle designers can show they have a driver monitoring system and engagement model that provide real-world results.

        The reality is that these are not "driver assistance" systems. They are automated vehicles with a highly problematic approach to safety. This goes for all companies. Tesla is simply the most egregious due to poor driver monitoring quality and scale of deployed fleet. As human-supervised automated driving gets more functionality the safety problem will just keep getting worse.

        Source on twitter: https://twitter.com/greentheonly/status/1607475055713214464?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw from Dec 26th: contains video of impact. No injury apparent to the person in the video, but it was a very close thing. Also a screenshot of the vehicle log showing AEB engaged 2 seconds before impact. https://twitter.com/greentheonly/status/1609271955383029763?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
        For those saying "but Teslas are safer overall" that statement does not stem from any credible data I've ever seen: https://safeautonomy.blogspot.com/2022/12/take-tesla-safety-claims-with-about.html